Firms engaged in electronic commerce increasingly rely on machine learning algorithms to drive a wide array of managerial decisions. The goal of this paper is to understand how competition between firms affects their strategic choice of such algorithms. We model the interaction of two firms choosing learning algorithms as a game, and analyze its equilibria in terms of the resolution of the bias-variance tradeoffs faced by the players. We show that competition can lead to strange phenomena-for example, reducing the error incurred by a firm's algorithm can be harmful to that firm-and provide conditions under which such phenomena do not occur.
Introduction
Firms who engage in electronic commerce increasingly rely on predictive analytics to drive a wide array of managerial decisions, ranging from recommendations to customer targeting and pricing.
Given some data, a firm facing a potential customer will use predictive models or learning algorithms (henceforth algorithms) to anticipate the customer's future behavior and preferences, allowing it to better tailor its recommendation, targeting, and pricing decisions. In general, the success of such a strategy will depend on the effectiveness of the algorithms used, with these algorithms having advanced incredibly over the past couple of decades.
The point of departure for this paper is the observation that in many applications, firms utilizing predictive analytics do so in a competitive environment, and so the efficacy of a firm's analytics depends not only on its own expertise and technology but also on that of its competitors. Broadly speaking, this paper addresses the question of how the competitive nature of the interaction affects a firm's use of algorithms. For example, while a particular algorithm may be best for a monopolistic firm targeting a customer, it may be suboptimal in a competitive environment. Furthermore, the * This work was initiated during the Special Quarter on Data Science and Online Markets held in the spring of 2017 at Northwestern University.
optimal choice of algorithm in the competitive environment may depend on the competitors' choices of algorithms.
One useful way of analyzing algorithms is by examining the different sources of error they incur via a bias-variance decomposition: splitting the error into bias and variance. In practice, there are various ways of controlling the bias and variance of an algorithm: more complex algorithms, such as deeper decision trees or regressions with more polynomial terms, have lower bias but higher variance; regularization is often used to decrease variance at the expense of higher bias; and increasing the amount of training data decreases variance.
Accurate algorithms minimize the sum 1 of these terms-decreasing one term, holding others fixed, is always beneficial, and there is no preference of bias over variance or vice versa as long as the sum of the two is minimal. In this paper we aim to understand whether these observations also hold in a competitive environment.
Our main results indicate that they do not. First, we show that in general lowering bias or variance alone can be harmful. Second, we prove that, under some natural conditions, decreasing bias is always beneficial. Finally, we consider a tradeoff between bias and variance and show that, holding total error fixed, players strictly prefer to decrease bias at the cost of higher variance. One practical implication of these results is that, in competitive environments, there is an added benefit to more complex algorithms and added cost to regularization. In addition, there are scenarios in which obtaining larger datasets may be a strategically harmful decision.
In this paper we model the interaction of two firms as a game, and analyze its equilibria.
Players' actions are algorithms, and their utilities in expectation depend both on the accuracy of their chosen algorithm's prediction and on whether or not their prediction is better than that of their opponent. In most of the paper we abstract away from the details of specific algorithms, and instead model an algorithm as a distribution over predictions. Thus, players' sets of actions in the game are a class parameterized by a distribution, with elements ranging over biases and variances.
A canonical example is the set of normal distributions with different means and standard deviations.
For our first results, we show that there are classes of distributions and opponent's choices of distributions for which a player prefers to choose a distribution with higher bias (respectively, higher variance), holding variance (respectively, bias) fixed. While the result on the benefit of higher variance holds for general classes of distributions, the result on higher bias does not: we show that if the class of distributions is "natural"-a class that includes normal and Laplace distributionsthen for any realization of the opponent's choice, a player is better off with a lower-bias distribution (holding the variance fixed).
Our main theoretical result is that if a player's action set consists of normal distributions, then this preference for lower bias holds even if the variance is not fixed. That is, for two normal distributions with the same total error, the player prefers the one with lower bias (and higher variance) regardless of the realization of the opponent's choice. In other words, no-bias is an ex post dominant strategy.
We supplement our theoretical results with numerical and empirical ones. First, we test the robustness of our insight on the preference of bias over variance numerically with other families of distributions, such as Laplace, and other utility functions. Our insight persists in many of the variations, but not all -for example, they fail if players' predictions are uniformly distributed.
Second, we consider our game but with specific algorithms on a specific dataset. Players utilize a Ridge regression algorithm on a housing prices dataset 2 , controlling for the bias-variance tradeoff using a regularization parameter. With only one player the optimal choice of regularization parameter may be large (indicating larger bias and lower variance), but with two players utilities increase as the parameter is lowered (that is, for lower bias and higher variance).
Related literature The question of games between players playing learning algorithms can be viewed as a special case of the dueling algorithms framework of Immorlica et al. (2011) .
The analysis of learning algorithms in strategic environments is a newly burgeoning area of study. Within this area, the papers most closely related to ours are Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2017) and Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018) . Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018) , who build on Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2017), consider a PAC learning with multiple learners with access to the same dataset. They show that this game has a pure Nash equilibrium and that better-response learning dynamics converge to it. One major difference between their work and ours is that in their work players' algorithms are fixed (more formally, in learning-theoretic terms, the hypothesis classes are fixed), whereas in ours the emphasis is on the choice of learning algorithms (by analogy, the choice of hypothesis classes). A second difference is that in their model all learners have access to the same data, whereas in ours different learners have separate datasets.
Another related paper is that of Mansour et al. (2018) . They also consider competition between learners, but in an online setting in which the learners are bandit algorithms. They study the effect of competition between the bandit algorithms on the exploration/exploitation tradeoff, and show that the presence of competition may lead to the strategic choice of bandit algorithms that do not explore as much as they would absent competition, and may thus be worse learners.
Model and Preliminaries
In general, a learning algorithm A takes as input data D = {(x 1 , f (x 1 )), . . . , (x m , f (x m ))} and a point x, and outputs a predictionf (x) of f (x). In this paper we will abstract away from the algorithm itself, and will only be concerned with its error in prediction f (x) −f (x), viewed as a distribution over R. The randomness in this distribution arises both from the choice of D and from the inherent randomness in A.
This paper is concerned with players' choice of algorithm. Thus, we will let players choose a distribution from some class of distributions, as follows. Fix some random variable Z with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. A common choice for Z will be normal, a choice we motivate in Section 4.1, but we can also consider uniform, triangle, Laplace, and other distributions. Players might, for example, choose from distributions in the class
the set of distributions whose bias squared plus variance (that is, its squared error) is at least 1.
One player
Now, suppose there is only one player, and suppose he chooses some distribution X. On realization a, let the player's utility be u(a) = 1 − a 2 : a benefit of 1 minus his squared loss. His expected
. Some standard observations:
Proof. X is a random variable with variance σ 2 and expected value µ.
This observation implies three corollaries. First, for fixed bias, the player prefers minimal variance:
Corollary 2.2. For any µ, if σ < σ , then the player prefers X = (σZ + µ) to X = (σ Z + µ).
Similarly, for fixed variance, the player prefers minimal bias:
Corollary 2.3. For any σ, if µ 2 < ν 2 , then the player prefers X = (σZ + µ) to X = (σZ + ν).
Finally:
Corollary 2.4. If X = σZ + µ, X = τ Z + ν, and µ 2 + σ 2 = ν 2 + τ 2 , then the player is indifferent between X and X .
Individual rationality One additional definition that will be useful is that of individual rationality. Intuitively, a distribution will be individually rational if a player derives non-negative utility from choosing it. Formally:
A simple observation that follows from Claim 2.1 is that X is IR if and only if X is such that
Two players
The bias-variance game is a two player game that might be appropriate for modeling the competition between firms that use algorithms that, for example, personalize outcomes to customer preferences and the firm with better personalization for a customer wins that customer and obtains value that is related to the accuracy of the personalization.
Definition 2.2 (The Bias-variance Game). In the two player bias-variance game:
1. Both players i ∈ {1, 2} choose distribution X i from X i .
2. Both players i obtain samples a i ∼ X i .
3. The player i * ∈ argmin i a i wins (ties broken randomly) and has payoff 1−a 2 i * ; the other player 3 − i * loses and has payoff 0.
We will primarily consider bias-variance games where X 1 = X 2 = X is a family of distribution with error for X ∈ X normalized as µ 2 + σ 2 = 1.
Individual rationality Individual rationality of the one-player setting implies individual rationality of the two-player setting.
Proposition 2.5. Bias-variance games with distributions X ∈ X satisfying µ 2 + σ 2 ≤ 1 are individually rational, i.e., expected payoffs in the game are non-negative.
Proof. In the one-player setting player i's expected payoff with draw a i ∼ X i is E 1 − a 2 i ≥ 0 which satisfies individual rationality. Consider the two player game where the other player j = 3 − i has draw a j . When the other player's draw is |a j | ≤ 1, the payoff of player i is non-negative for all a i : for |a i | ≤ |a j | ≤ 1 player i wins and has non-negative payoff 1 − a 2 i and for |a i | > |a j | then player i loses and has payoff 0. When the other player's draw is |a j | > 1, then player i's distribution of payoffs in the two player game dominates her distribution of payoffs in the one-player setting (when player i loses, instead of a negative payoff her payoff is zero). As the latter setting had non-negative expectation, so does the former.
Solution concepts We will utilize two solution concepts. For our numerical results we will consider the utilities of players when their opponents' strategies are fixed, and so look for a pure Nash equilibrium. Such equilibria always exist in the games we consider, as the theorem below states. For our main theoretical result on the preference of bias over variance we will show that there exists a much stronger equilibrium, namely one in ex post dominant strategies. Definition 2.3. A strategy profile (X 1 , X 2 ) is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if for each player i and strategy
Theorem 2.6. Fix a pair (Z 1 , Z 2 ), and let X 1 = {σZ 1 + µ : (µ, σ) ∈ C 1 } and X 2 = {σZ 2 + µ : (µ, σ) ∈ C 2 }, where C 1 and C 2 are compact, convex subsets of R 2 . Then the game has a PNE. Definition 2.4. A strategy X i ∈ X i is ex post dominant for player i if for all X i ∈ X i and all realizations a j of player j it holds that u i (X i , a j ) ≥ u i (X i , a j ).
Reducing Bias/Variance, All Else Fixed
In this section we show that reducing bias (resp., variance) holding variance (resp., bias) fixed can be harmful. We begin with an example in which decreasing variance is harmful:
Example 3.1. Suppose player 2 plays the distribution N (0, ε), where ε is some small number, and player 1 plays the distribution N (1/2, 1/2). Player 1's strategy is monotone and satisfies IR, and he obtains positive expected utility: Given that he wins, he is likely within ε of 0, and he wins with positive probability. However, if player 1 decreases his variance to, say, 0, he will obtain utility close to 0, since he will hardly ever win (for small enough ε).
Next, consider the following example, in which decreasing bias is harmful: Again, for small enough ε > 0 this satisfies IR. Now consider a deviation by Player 1 to the interval [−1 − ε, 1 + ε], a deviation that reduces bias. This is harmful: Before the deviation, he never won when his realization was in (1 + ε, 1 + 2ε]. After the deviation, however, the only difference is the additional possibility of winning when his realization is in [−1 − ε, −1). But such victories are harmful, as they consist only of negative utilities.
Unlike Example 3.1, Example 3.2 is somewhat unnatural, in that the distributions used are uniform. In Section 4.1 we argue that we should expect the distribution of the predictions of learning algorithms to be normal. Is there an example in which reducing bias is harmful, but where the class of distributions is more natural? The following two theorems state that there is not. The first considers a class of distributions that are single-peaked, monotone, and with convex tails, and the second considers normal distributions.
Theorem 3.1. Let Z be monotone and convex on [−∞, 0], and symmetric around 0. Let X i = σZ + µ be IR (and so satisfy µ 2 + σ 2 ≤ 1), and X i = σZ. Then u i (X i , c) ≥ u i (X i , c) for any realization c of player j.
Proof. The proof consists of several cases. 1) µ ≥ c: Since µ 2 + σ 2 ≤ 1, it must be the case that c ≤ 1. Thus, for any realization in which player i gets non-zero utility, his utility is nonnegative under both X i and X i . Consider first the distribution X i = σZ + c. Observe that, by monotonicity, for each point c] , the pdf at x under X i is higher than under X i . Since all such realizations lead to positive utility, u(X i ) ≥ u(X i ).
Next, consider the comparison between X i and X i . On the interval [0, c] the distribution X i is an inversion of X i with higher probability closer to the origin, and so on this sub-interval X leads to higher utility. On the interval [−c, 0] the pdf of X i dominates that of X i , and so also here X i leads to higher utility. Thus, u(X i ) ≥ u(X i ), and so u(X i ) ≥ u(X i ). 2a) µ < c ≤ 1: Consider Figure 1a , in which X is the green pdf and X is the blue pdf. Area E (from −1 to 1, and below both curves) leads to the same utility for both distributions. Area A (under X ) leads to higher utility than area B (under X). And finally, area D (under X ) leads to strictly positive utility. Thus, overall, u(X ) ≥ u(X).
2b) c > 1: Consider Figure 1b , in which X is the green pdf and X is the blue pdf. Area E (from −c to c, and below both curves) leads to the same utility for both distributions. Area A (under X ) leads to higher utility than area B (under X). Area D (under X ) leads to strictly positive utility.
It remains to show that the losses under X due to realizations in [−c, −1) ∪ (1, c] are smaller than the losses on the same intervals due to X. To this end, we will consider points x ∈ (1, c],
and show that the sum of the pdfs of X at x and −x is larger than the sum of the pdfs of X at those same points. Let g be the pdf of X . Then the sum of the pdfs of X at points
x and −x is g(x) + g(−x) = 2g(x). The sum of the pdfs of X at the points x and and −x is
, completing the claim.
Theorem 3.2. Let Z be normal. Let X i = σZ + µ and satisfy µ + σ ≤ 1), and X i = σZ. Then
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 3.1, except for case 2b: the upper tail of the normal distribution is convex only from µ + σ onward. So this case must be handled differently.
However, to complete the proof, we actually only need that the pdf g of X be convex from the point 1 − µ and higher. Since µ + σ ≤ 1 it holds that 1 − µ ≥ σ, and so g is convex on [c − µ, c + µ] whenever c ≥ 1, completing the proof.
Tradeoff between Bias and Variance
In this section, we consider the tradeoff between bias and variance (i.e., µ 2 + σ 2 = 1) in two-player competition. Notice that the requirement µ 2 + σ 2 = 1 ensures the IR constraint always binds in one-player optimization setting, i.e., u(X) = 1−µ 2 −σ 2 = 0 for all X. We fix the random variable Z to be normal, and show that for arbitrary realization a j from the opponent player j, reducing bias µ i while increasing variance to σ 2 i = 1 − µ 2 i is always beneficial for player i. Numerical calculations at the end of this section, which consider distributions other than normal and variations on players' utility functions, suggest that our insight for normal distribution is robust. First, however, we motivate the use of normal distributions.
Motivation for Normal Distribution
Many commonly used econometric and machine learning procedures with tuning parameters determining the bias-variance tradeoff have been demonstrated to produce predictions whose error distributions are asymptotically normal, making the case for the normal distribution in our model. One important example is the Ridge regression which produces prediction y = w T x for the label corresponding to the high-dimensional set of features x ∈ X ⊂ R p via the vector of weights w. The estimator w minimizes the regularized empirical risk function
from the set of examples {y i ,
with L 2 penalty scaled by λ. The penalty constant λ is responsible for the bias-variance tradeoff in the prediction. While increasing λ increases the bias of prediction, it decreases the variance. Suppose that the true model generating the data is y i = w T 0 x i + e i where features x i are deterministic with max k=1,...,p |x (k) i | < B and e i are independent and identically distributed variables with mean zero E[|e i | 2+δ ] < ∞ for some δ > 0.
Note that we can express the minimizer of the empirical risk as
Note that since e i are mean zero random variables, then
Therefore for prediction y = w T x, we can express asymptotic bias as
By the Central Limit Theorem
where
Note that bias(λ) is monotone increasing in λ. At the same time V (λ) is monotone decreasing in λ.
The normal random variable with mean bias(λ) and variance V (λ)/n approximates the distribution of the prediction error y − w T 0 x.
Preference for Lower Bias in Normal Distribution
Theorem 3.2 shows that reducing bias in normal distributions is beneficial if the variance is fixed.
Here we give a "stronger" result: that as long as the total error is fixed, reducing bias (which increases variance) in normal distribution is also beneficial under normal distributions.
Theorem 4.1. Let Z be normal. Let X i = σZ + µ and X i = τ Z + ν, where µ 2 + σ 2 = ν 2 + τ 2 = 1.
for any realization a of player j.
Corollary 4.2. Let Z be normal. The strategy Z is ex post dominant within the strategy class
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We compute the expected utility of player i with random variable X = σZ + µ against the realization a of player j. Without loss of generality, we assume a ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0.
where Φ(·) is the CDF of Z, i.e., the standard normal distribution.
Due to constraint that µ 2 + σ 2 = 1,
Take the derivative of E[u(X, a)] respect to µ,
Figure 2: Ex post utility curves of player i against different realization a j from opponent player j.
To prove Theorem 4.1, it is sufficient to show this derivative is non-negative for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0, and it can be simplified as
The remaining proof for inequality (2) is quite tedious with heavy calculation, and so is deferred to Appendix A as Lemma A.1.
Numerical Results for Other Distributions and Payoffs
In this subsection, we want to illustrate the robustness of Theorem 4.1. Specifically, in the proof of Theorem 4.1, there are two assumptions which enable a clean closed form for ex post utility, and thus, simplify our argument: (a) the shape (i.e., density function) of normal distribution; (b) the utility function u i (a 1 , a 2 ) = (1 − a 2 i ) · 1{a i < a j } with assumption µ 2 + σ 2 = 1 which makes the term with CDF Φ(·) cancel out. We mathematically write the closed form of the utility on variants of distributions and utility function, and use MATLAB to numerically evaluate its value.
The following numerical calculation results suggest that our result holds generally in many cases beyond our theoretical assumptions (a), (b).
Other Distributions We numerically calculate the ex post utility curves (against arbitrary realization from the opponent player) and expected utility curves (against arbitrary strategies of the opponent) on various distributions. As shown in Theorem 4.1, with normal distribution, the ex post utility curve is always non-increasing for all opponents' realizations. Based on numerically evaluations with Laplace distribution, its ex post utility curve is also non-increasing for all opponents' realizations. See Figure 2 , where we plot the ex post utility curves u i (µ i , a j ) holding realization a j fixed for normal distribution, and Laplace distribution. The x-axis of each figure is player i's µ i , and the y-axis is the ex post utility u i ( 1 − µ 2 i Z + µ i , a j ). Another interesting observation through this numerical result is that with normal distributions, the ex post utility is almost flat for µ i ≤ 0.5, i.e., while µ i = 0 is a dominant strategy, picking any µ i ∈ [0, 0.5] is a "pretty good" strategy.
For logistic distribution, the ex post utility curve is no longer non-increasing; however, the expected utility curve is non-increasing against arbitrary strategies of the opponent, i.e., picking the no-bias distribution X i = Z is the unique pure Nash equilibrium.
For uniform distributions, monotonicity does not hold on either the ex post utility curve or the expected utility curve (and there is a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium with non-trivial bias). See Figure 3 for logistic distributions and uniform distributions.
Other Utility Functions Here we consider the utility function u i (a i , a j ) = (R − a 2 i ) · 1{a i < a j } for arbitrary reward R > 0 with normal distribution Z. For general reward R = 1, (i.e., either the IR constraint does not bind or it is violated), the monotonicity of ex post utility does not hold. However, the expected utility curve is still non-increasing against arbitrary strategies of the opponent, and no-bias remains a dominant strategy. See Figure 4 .
Empirical Results
In this section we test our insight on the preference of variance over bias on a widely-used dataset.
In particular, we utilize the California housing prices data from the 1990 Census, a dataset first Figure 4 : Expected utility curves of player i against different strategy µ j from opponent player j with normal distribution.
utilized by Pace and Barry (1997) More specifically, we do the following:
1. Use 10% of the data for testing.
2. From the remaining 90%, each player draws a random half.
3. Each player learns 100 Ridge regressions, with λ i ranging from 0 to 1000 in intervals of 10 for each player i.
4. For each (λ 1 , λ 2 ), players play the game on the 10% test data, summing the utilities.
Repeating the procedure above 100 times and summing the utilities leads to the utilities depicted in the respective payoff matrices of Figures 5a and 5b. In these figures player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player, and the (i, j)'th entry corresponds to the row player choosing λ 1 = 10i and the column player choosing λ 2 = 10j. In Figure 5a , for example, player 1's utilities are higher as the choice of λ 1 is lower, corresponding to a choice of lower bias and higher variance.
The same can be seen in Figure 5b , where player 2's utility is higher as he lowers λ 2 .
Observe also that the benefit of lower bias/higher variance is higher when the opponent plays a higher bias/lower variance strategy. A Omitted Proof in Theorem 4.1
In this section, we show that the derivative of the ex post utility with respect to µ against any realization a of the opponent is non-positive for all all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0.
Lemma A.1. The inequality (2) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0.
Notice that there are two regimes: (a) the player always gains non-negative payoff, i.e., a ∈ [0, 1];
(b) the player sometimes suffers negative payoff, i.e., a > 1. Therefore, we break Lemma A.1 into these two regimes and show them separately.
Lemma A.2. The inequality (2) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Starting from inequality (2) copied here:
Consider the following two cases.
Case 1: (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) > 0; multiply both sides by exp
(and now it is obvious that we can drop the term (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1), because we have (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) ≤ 1 from µ 2 ≤ 1) so the factor is "gainy")
(replace exponential functions with Taylor Series)
(pull out first two terms of the Series)
(separate it into two inequalities and if both are true then the combined inequality is true)
Condition 1a:
(split out the terms in the first bracket and cancel (1 − aµ)(1 + aµ))
(further cancel additive constants from both sides)
which is finally true, directly from the assumption of Case 1.
and Condition 1b:
(drop the gainy (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) terms, by the left-hand side sum terms dominating for every k)
Case 2: (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) ≤ 0.
Case 2a: aµ ≥ 1; drop the term (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) from both sides in inequality (2) (2) ⇐ (2µ
which holds immediately because under assumptions of Case 2a, the LHS is non-negative and the RHS is non-positive.
Case 2b: aµ < 1; working from inequality (2) (2) ⇔ (replace exponential functions with Taylor Series)
Condition 2b1:
(split out the terms in the first bracket and cancel resulting (additively) matching terms) (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) · (1 − aµ) · (−µ 2 ) + (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) · (+aµ)
⇔ (combine terms, flip the minus sign in (−µ 2 ), divide by 2) (2µ
⇔ (divide by aµ 3 and re-organize)
(1 − µ 2 ) + (1 − µ 2 ) ≥ ((1 − µ 2 ) + (a 2 − µ 2 )) true by Case 2b1 assumption that x ≤ 1 Condition 2b2:
(it is sufficient to show that it holds for each pair of consecutive terms, starting with the first remaining term for k = 2) (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) · (1 − aµ) + (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) k k! + ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) k+1 (k + 1)! ≥ (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) k k! − ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) k+1 (k + 1)! ⇔ (factor out common terms within the bracket of Taylor Series terms) (2µ 2 − a 2 − 1) · (1 − aµ) + (2µ 2 (1 − µ 2 )) ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) k k! 1 + ((aµ)/(1 − µ 2 )) (k + 1) Proof. The main technique is to show that the left hand side in inequality (2) is a monotone increasing function in a, thus, it is sufficient to check the boundary case where a = 1. And to show the left hand side is monotone increasing, we will show that its derivative is non-negative, which we will reuse this technique (it is still increasing, thus only need to check a = 1) again. We will repeat this technique three times.
